

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NIC-01

DRC-01 OMB-01 EA-11 EURE-00 /161 W

----- 029257

P 191138Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3975

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 14401

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: ARBATOV SPEECH ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS

REF: STATE 227359

1. FOLLOWING IS EXTENDED SUMMARY OF ARBATOV SPEECH
NOVEMBER 15 AT CEREMONY COMMEMORATING 40TH ANNIVERSARY
OF ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY:

FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLO-
MATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET UNION IS
DATE FOR MEDITATION. AND, NOT JUST BECAUSE NO OTHER
TWO POWERS TODAY ON WHOSE RELATIONS DEPEND INTERNA-
TIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE AND SUCH BASIC QUESTIONS
AS WAR AND PEACE. THIS IS FULLY OBVIOUS TRUTH, AND
IS NO NEED TO RECALL IT CONSTANTLY. HOWEVER, I
WANT TO CAUTION THAT IT OUGHT NOT BE FORGOTTEN UNDER
ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE
CONFIRMED THIS WITH ALL FORCE.

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HISTORY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IS OF GREAT
INTEREST. NO TWO OTHER STATES SO FULLY EMBODY TWO
SOCIAL SYSTEMS DIVIDING WORLD, SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM.
THE HISTORY OF THEIR RELATIONS CAN SERVE AS CONCENTRATED

EXPRESSION OF MOST IMPORTANT TRENDS OF 20TH-CENTURY WORLD POLITICS, I.E., THE RELATIONS OF THESE TWO SYSTEMS. HISTORY SHOWS A WIDE SPECTRUM FROM ARMED CONFLICT (U.S. INTERVENTION IN 1918-1919) TO ALLIANCE DURING WORLD WAR II -- FROM TOTAL HOSTILITY OF THE COLD WAR TO TODAY'S PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE.

HISTORY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IS ALSO RICH IN HISTORICAL LESSONS. I HAVE IN MIND NOT ONLY UNDISPUTED LESSON THAT HISTORY SHOWS HOW GREAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR TWO GREAT POWERS TO DAMAGE ONE ANOTHER, EVEN TO TOTAL DAMAGE OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND AT SAME TIME THEIR POSSIBILITIES TO COOPERATE FOR GOOD IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE. THIS IS OBVIOUS.

TODAY I WANT TO DWELL ON TWO OTHER LESSONS, NO LESS IMPORTANT.

ONE IS THAT POLITICAL REALISM HAS ALWAYS WORKED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND HAS FOSTERED THEIR IMPROVEMENT AT SAME TIME AS DEPARTURE FROM REALISM HAS HARMED THEM. SUCH AN ASSERTION MAY SEEM PARADOXICAL. FOR, FROM POLITICAL REALISTS ONE USUALLY EXPECTS PESSIMISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD IMPROVEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND WE ARE INCLINED TO SUSPECT OPTIMISTS OF IDEALISM. THIS IS SOMETIMES JUSTIFIED, BUT NOT IN REGARD TO SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

HERE, ON CONTRARY, PERIODS OF IMPROVEMENT AND POSITIVE SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN CONNECTED WITH TURNS TOWARD REALISM, AND PERIODS OF WORSENING WITH ABSENCE OF REALISM AND SUBORDINATION OF POLICY TO ILLUSORY OBJECTIVES.

TAKE FACT THAT 56TH ANNIVERSARY OF OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND FORMATION OF SOVIET STATE WERE MARKED A WEEK AGO, BUT TODAY WE MARK ONLY 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF U.S. UNCLASSIFIED

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RECOGNITION OF THIS STATE. WHY DID U.S., IN MANY SPHERE SO ATTUNED TO WHAT IS NEW, REQUIRE 16 YEARS TO RECOGNIZE OBVIOUS FACT OF THE HISTORICAL CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN RUSSIA?

ONLY BECAUSE BLINDNESS IN ITS POLICY AT THAT TIME, ENGENDERED BY CLASS HATRED FOR THE FIRST SOCIALIST STATE, TOOK PRECEDENCE OVER REALISM. IN FAIRNESS, ONE MUST SAY THIS DID NOT APPLY TO ALL AMERICA. NOT ONLY DID MANY THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS GREET REVOLUTION WITH SYMPATHY. THERE WERE MANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BUSINESS WORLD, NO LESS COMMITTED TO CAPITALISM THAN A SENATOR OR PRESIDENT, WHO HAD A SENSE OF REALITY AND WHO NOT

ONLY WERE RECOGNIZING SOVIET POWER DE FACTO BEFORE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO HAD BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH IT.

PURSuing THIS THOUGHT, THE FIRST POSITIVE TURN IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS --ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS -- WAS CONNECTED WITH A TURN TOWARD REALITY IN AMERICAN POLICY.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WAS JUST AS DEVOTED TO CAPITALISM AS ANY OF HIS PREDECESSORS, BUT HE WAS CAPABLE OF THIS TURN BECAUSE HE COULD PLACE POLITICAL REALISM ABOVE IDEOLOGICAL PREJUDICES.

UNDERTAKING THIS STEP ROOSEVELT HAD AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN MIND. I AM SPEAKING NOT ONLY ABOUT TRADE, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS IMPORTANT FOR AMERICA, WHICH WAS EXPERIENCING AN ECONOMIC CRISIS. AT THE TIME OF THE GROWING FASCIST AND JAPANESE THREAT TO THE U.S., THE POSITION OF ABSOLUTE CONFRONTATION WITH "GODLESS COMMUNISM" BECAME AN INADMISSABLE LUXURY. AMERICAN STATE INTERESTS DEMANDED NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, AND ROOSEVELT UNDERSTOOD THIS POLITICAL REALITY.

NO NEED TO DETAIL HOW THIS DECISION WAS ONE OF THE IMPORTANT FOUNDATIONS FOR CREATION OF THE ANTI-HITLER COALITION IN WORLD WAR II.

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STATISTICS SHOW CONTRIBUTION OF GREAT POWERS TO THE MILITARY EFFORT AND HOW MUCH U.S. PROFITED FROM ALLIANCE WITH USSR. SOVIET PEOPLE LOST 20 MILLION; U.S. FORCES 400,000. WAR COST USSR 485 BILLION DOLLARS; U.S. 330 BILLION. U.S. GAVE 10 BILLION IN LEND-LEASE TO USSR.

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NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NIC-01

DRC-01 OMB-01 EA-11 EURE-00 /161 W

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1941-1945 WROTE BRILLIANT PAGE IN CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES FOUGHT COMMON ENEMIES TO TOTAL VICTORY IN EUROPE AND ASIA. JOINT STRUGGLE LED TO A COMMON POSITION ON A NUMBER OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS, FIXED AT BIG THREE MEETINGS AND AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UN. ROOSEVELT GAVE GREAT SERVICE IN THIS, AND SOVIET PEOPLE TODAY HAVE GOOD MEMORIES OF THOSE POLICIES.

IN RADIO BROADCAST JANUARY 6, 1945 ROOSEVELT SAID: "PEACE CAN BE ATTAINED AND PRESERVED ONLY BY THE SINGLE DETERMINATION OF FREE AND PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES WHO WANT TO WORK TOGETHER, WHO WANT TO HELP ONE ANOTHER, WHO WANT TO RESPECT AND RELATE WITH TOLERANCE TO ONE ANOTHER AND TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE OPINIONS AND MOOD OF ONE ANOTHER.

IN THE COMING WORLD THE ABUSE OF POWER, INHERENT IN THE VERY TERM 'POWER POLITICS' MUST NOT BE THE DOMINANT FACTOR OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE. SUCH IS THE ESSENCE OF PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH WE SPEAK." ADDRESSING CONGRESS ON THE RESULTS OF YALTA CONFERENCE PRESIDENT SAID: "THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE WAS SUCCESSFUL EFFORT BY THE THREE LEADING POWERS TO FIND A GENERAL FOUNDATION UNCLASSIFIED

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FOR PEACE. IT MUST PUT END TO SYSTEM OF UNILATERAL ACTIONS, CLOSED ALLIANCES, SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, BALANCES OF POWER, AND TO ALL OTHER DEVICES TO WHICH RECOURSE HAS BEEN TAKEN IN COURSE OF CENTURIES AND WHICH HAVE CLEARLY SUFFERED FAILURE."

SUCH A VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE POST-WAR YEARS WAS SEEN RIGHT AFTER WAR BY MANY AMERICAN LEADERS AS MANIFESTATION OF "GOOD-HEARTED IDEALISM". TODAY, ENLIGHTENED BY EXPERIENCE OF POST-WAR DECADES, WE CAN SAY THAT IT WAS MORE REALISTIC THAN THAT WHICH CREATED "COLD WAR" BUILT ON ILLUSIONS AND PREJUDICES.

FOR ROOSEVELT DREW ABOVE CONCLUSIONS FROM A REALISTIC IDEA ABOUT THE NEW WORLD SITUATION. IT IS NOW ACCEPTED AS NOT WITHOUT FOUNDATION TO BLAME THE MILITARY FOR THE MANY MISTAKES IN AMERICAN POLICY, BUT I WILL SAY A FEW WORDS IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN WAR-

TIME GENERAL STAFF. IN RECOMMENDATIONS TO CORDELL HULL IN AUGUST 1944, THEY SAID THAT "VICTORY IN THE WAR WOULD CAUSE DEEP CHANGES IN THE POWER OF NATIONS, COMPARABLE ONLY TO CHANGES WHICH FOLLOWED FALL OF ROME, THAT U.S. AND USSR WOULD REMAIN THE ONLY TWO GREAT POWERS, AND THAT THE POWER AND GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONS OF THESE TWO POWERS WOULD EXCLUDE DEFEAT OF ONE BY THE OTHER EVEN IF ONE SHOULD BE ALLIED WITH THE BRITISH EMPIRE."

ONE CAN ASSUME THAT UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS ROOSEVELT SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO COOPERATION WITH THE USSR IN THE POST-WAR EPOCH. THESE REALISTIC CONSIDERATIONS PROMPTED HIM TO DECLARE THAT AFTER THE WAR ONE MUST NOT ADHERE TO METHODS WHICH SUFFERED BANKRUPTCY.

UNFORTUNATELY IDEAS OF ROOSEVELT'S SUCCESSORS WERE DIFFERENT. THEY DID NOT WANT TO MAKE PEACE WITH SITUATION WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED. HENCE, "THE COLD WAR", BETTING ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE SOVIET UNION. IN ESSENCE, WHOLE POST-WAR PERIOD IS PERMEATED WITH A PERSISTENT EFFORT NOT TO CONSIDER NEW REALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. RESULTS ARE GENERALLY KNOWN: THE COLD WAR UNCLASSIFIED

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DID NOT ATTAIN THOSE ENDS ON WHICH ITS INITIATORS COUNTED. AT SAME TIME A SITUATION BECAME CLEAR WHICH WAS REGRETTABLE FOR THE SUPPORTERS OF POLITICS FROM A "POSITION OF STRENGTH": THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS ATTAINED SUCH A LEVEL THAT IT BECAME IMPOSSIBLE TO USE FORCE IN A RATIONAL POLICY. MOREOVER, THE UNLIMITED ARMS RACE TURNED OUT TO HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE U.S., ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, DEEPENING A NUMBER OF SERIOUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE COLD WAR, WITH CONSTANT THREAT OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE, LED AMERICAN POLICY INTO LABYRINTHS OF INSOLUBLE COMPLEXITIES, MOST CLEAR EXAMPLE OF WHICH WAS VIET-NAM.

IN LAST DECADE U.S. BEGAN A SEARCH FOR NEW APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, FOR, THE POSTULATES UNDERLYING THE COLD WAR BECAME POSITIVELY DANGEROUS FOR AMERICA. A SCHOOL OF "REALISTS" APPEARED. KISSINGER ATTRACTED ATTENTION AS A SCHOLAR BECAUSE OF HIS INSISTANCE ON RECOGNIZING THE REALITIES OF THE PRESENT DAY.

IF ONE TALKS ABOUT CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY MADE POSSIBLE BY NORMALIZATION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, THEN AT BASIS OF THESE LIES REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. LEADERS CAME TO THESE TRUTHS VIA A DIFFICULT ROAD. WE RECALL IN THIS CONNECTION SEVERAL EXPRESSIONS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

AND THEN KENNEDY; WE GIVE THEM THEIR DUE FOR THEIR
INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL ACTIONS. NOVELTY OF NIXON
ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO URGENT POLITICAL PROBLEMS
LIES NOT ONLY IN FACT THAT THERE ARE NEW PHENOMENA IN
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BUT ALSO IN FACT THAT U.S.
IS BEGINNING TO DRAW PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS FOR ITS
POLICY FROM LONG-KNOWN FACTS.

ANOTHER LESSON PROMPTED BY HISTORY OF SOVIET-
AMERICAN RELATIONS, I WOULD FORMULATE THUS: ITS WHOLE
EXPERIENCE SAYS ONE MUST NOT MISS THE POSSIBILITIES
FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WHICH EXIST TODAY, FOR
ONE CAN NEVER BE CERTAIN THAT TOMORROW WILL NOT BE TOO
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LATE. MANY PAGES IN HISTORY OF USSR-U.S. RELATIONS ARE
EPISODES OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES. THE THIRTIES IT
WAS IMPORTANT THAT AT THEIR BEGINNING DIPLOMATIC RELA-
TIONS WERE ESTABLISHED -- THIS DOUBTLESSLY HELPED
ACHIEVE VICTORY AGAINST FASCISM. BUT IF WEST,
INCLUDING THE U.S., HAD TREATED POSITIVELY SOVIET
SUGGESTIONS ABOUT CREATION OF A COLLECTIVE SECURITY
SYSTEM, IT IS FULLY POSSIBLE THAT WAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN
PREVENTED. NOT ONLY SOVIET BUT MANY AMERICAN HISTORIANS
THINK THIS TODAY, E.G. PROF. J. STOSSINGER, WHO WROTE
RECENTLY THAT IF THE U.S. AND "RUSSIA IN THE 30'S HAD
SUCCEEDED IN REACHING A TRUE MODUS VIVENDI, THE
CREATION OF A UNITED FRONT AGAINST THE AXIS POWERS
WOULD HAVE BECOME POSSIBLE BEFORE THE CATAclysm OF
WORLD WAR II FORCED THE TWO POWERS TO BECOME CLOSE,
ALBEIT TEMPORARY ALLIES. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, HE
CONCLUDES, NOT TO THINK ABOUT WHAT THE WORLD WOULD BE
NOW, IF THE USSR AND U.S. HAD BEEN ABLE TO COOPERATE
ACTIVELY IN THE 30'S CURBING THE GROWTH OF THE AXIS
POWERS AND THEREBY AVERTING THE SUBSEQUENT TRAGEDY."

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USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NIC-01

DRC-01 OMB-01 EA-11 EURE-00 /161 W

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ALTHOUGH HISTORY DOES NOT KNOW A SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD AND GENERALLY AMONG SCHOLARS IT IS NOT CONSIDERED GOOD TO MORALIZE ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IF, I WILL BRING UP TWO MORE EXAMPLES OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES. ONE OF THESE IS END OF THE WAR AND THE PERSPECTIVE WHICH EMERGED FOR REBUILDING RELATIONS ON FOUNDATIONS WHICH PARTIES TO THE ANTI-HITLER COALITION WORKED OUT. THIS CHANCE, FOR KNOWN REASONS, WAS NOT USED, AND NO LESS KNOWN IS WHAT THIS COST THE SOVIET UNION, THE U.S. AND THE WHOLE WORLD.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS END OF FIFTIES AND BEGINNING OF SIXTIES, TIME OF FIRST THAW, TIME OF HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS WHICH UNFORTUNATELY DISAPPOINTED. CONDITIONS FOR DECISIVE TURN TOWARD PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WERE PROBABLY LESS MATURE THAN NOW. BUT I VENTURE TO SAY THAT POSSIBILITIES NEVERTHELESS DID EXIST AT THAT TIME. BUT THEY WERE LOST, SOMETIMES THROUGH PURE HAPPENSTANCE -- WE REMEMBER THE U-2 EPISODE, AND THEN THE TRAGIC DEATH OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. SO THE SIXTIES, WHICH PROMISED SO MUCH AT THE OUTSET, TURNED OUT TO BE DECADE OF MOST INTENSIVE ARMS RACE IN HISTORY, DECADE OF MOST DANGEROUS CONFRONTATIONS: THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS, TRAGIC WAR IN VIETNAM, SIX-DAY WAR IN MIDDLE EAST, UNCLASSIFIED

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RESULTS OF WHICH HAVE BEEN FELT FOR SIX YEARS ALREADY. I DON'T CLAIM ALL THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, BUT I'M SURE THAT IF THE AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVING SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS HAD BEEN USED, THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES WOULD HAVE LOOKED QUITE DIFFERENT.

I THINK THESE AND OTHER LESSONS OF HISTORY OF SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS ARE RELATED NOT ONLY TO PAST BUT TO PRESENT AND FUTURE. AND IT IS ENTIRELY FITTING TO MENTION THIS TODAY, IN PERIOD OF SUCH ENORMOUS POSITIVE CHANGES IN RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND USA.

ABOUT YEAR AND A HALF AGO THESE RELATIONS MADE SHARP TURN. WE ALL RECALL VISIT OF PRESIDENT NIXON TO MOSCOW IN MAY 1972. NEW AND MAGNIFICENT PAGE IN HISTORY OF RELATIONS WAS WRITTEN THIS YEAR. I REFER TO BREZHNEV VISIT TO USA, IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING THE VISIT, AND THE ATTITUDES AWAKENED IN U.S. AND SOVIET PEOPLES AS A RESULT.

MANY COMPLICATIONS OF COURSE, REMAIN IN INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AS EVIDENCED BY RECENT EVENTS IN MIDDLE EAST. BUT IF ONE FOLLOWS THE LOGIC OF FACTS AND NOT EMOTIONS, THESE EVENTS NOT ONLY DO NOT CANCEL OUT SIGNIFICANCE OF POSITIVE CHANGES IN SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS, THEY CONFIRM THEM WITH NEW STRENGTH. WITHOUT THESE CHANGES AND GREAT WORK DONE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS RECENTLY, IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE BEEN MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE SUCH QUICK CEASE-FIRE, LOCALIZE THE CONFLICT, AND PREVENT IT FROM GROWING INTO DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION OF GLOBAL PROPORTIONS.

POSITION OF SOVIET UNION ON RELATIONS WITH USA IS PRECISELY SET FORTH IN A NUMBER OF AUTHORITATIVE DOCUMENTS. LATEST OF THESE IS BREZHNEV SPEECH AT PEACE CONGRESS.

OUR COUNTRY CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATES FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND USA, BROAD DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION ON MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS AND EQUAL BASIS, STABILIZATION AND STRENGTHENING DETENTE AND MAKING IT UNCLASSIFIED

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IRREVERSIBLE. IF U.S. ADHERES TO SAME POSITION, RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES WILL HAVE THE BRIGHTEST PROSPECTS, WHICH IS IN THE VITAL INTEREST OF BOTH PEOPLES AS WELL AS OF WORLD PEACE.

SOVIET PUBLIC FULLY SUPPORTS THIS POLICY OF CPSU AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT. REPRESENTATIVES OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLED HERE ARE ACTIVISTS IN CAUSE OF DEVELOPING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION BETWEEN PEOPLES OF TWO COUNTRIES. PERMIT ME, DEAR FRIENDS, ON YOUR BEHALF TO SAY TO CHARGE DUBS, EMBASSY REPS AND OTHER U.S. CITIZENS PRESENT, THAT WE BELIEVE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN PEOPLES. WE BELIEVE SUCH RELATIONS ARE VITALLY IMPORTANT, AND WE HOPE THESE FEELINGS ON OUR PART ARE SHARED BY GREAT PART OF AMERICAN PUBLIC. END SUMMARY.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHMENT, SOCIAL RECEPTIONS, REPRESENTATION AT CEREMONIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973MOSCOW14401
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731166/abqcegbj.tel
Line Count: 424
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: STATE 227359
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: worrelsw
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <17-Aug-2001 by maustmc>; APPROVED <14 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ARBATOV SPEECH ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005